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DLD-193        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3578 
___________ 
 
RICHARD P. KAPLAN, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MR. EBERT, Warden, FCI Allenwood; MR. SCHRADER, Counselor, FCI Allenwood; 
JOHN DOE, Visitation Officer, FCI Allenwood 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-00605) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 24, 2016 
 
Before:     CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER1, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 3, 2016) 
 
 
                                              
1 The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case.  Judge 
Sloviter assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the 
filing of the opinion.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Federal prisoner Richard Kaplan appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision 
granting summary judgment against him in this civil action brought pursuant to Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, and the Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s decision. 
I. 
 Kaplan is currently serving a federal prison sentence for using an interstate 
commerce facility and the mail in an attempt to commit a murder for hire, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1958.  From May 2010 to February 2012, he was incarcerated at FCI 
Allenwood Medium (“Allenwood”) in White Deer, Pennsylvania.  In March 2014, he 
filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against three Allenwood prison officials — 
the warden, a counselor, and a John Doe “visitation officer.”  Kaplan alleged, inter alia, 
that he had been denied an attorney visit in August 2010, that the defendants had 
conspired against him in several respects, that certain documents were not provided to 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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him after he made requests under FOIA, and that he had been framed and falsely 
imprisoned for the aforementioned murder-for-hire charge.  In light of these allegations, 
he sought $20 million from each defendant.  Kaplan also asked the District Court to 
“place criminal charges” against the defendants and conduct a criminal investigation into 
the alleged conspiracy. 
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and, in the alternative, 
sought summary judgment.  Kaplan opposed the motion.  On October 1, 2015, the 
District Court entered an opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  In its 40-page opinion, the District Court liberally construed Kaplan’s 
complaint as raising claims under Bivens, the FTCA, and FOIA.  The District Court 
concluded that each of Kaplan’s Bivens claims was untimely, barred by Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),2 and/or relied on allegations that were insufficient for a 
reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor.  The District Court further concluded that 
his FTCA claim was untimely, and that his FOIA claims failed because he had not 
properly exhausted his administrative remedies. 
 Kaplan has timely appealed from the District Court’s judgment. 
II. 
                                              
2 In Heck, “the Supreme Court held that where success in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action 
would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the 
plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas 
remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”  Williams v. Consovoy, 
453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[T]he reasoning in Heck has been applied to bar 
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 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Lomando v. 
United States, 667 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011).3  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Although the 
non-movant’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in 
his favor in determining whether a genuine factual question exists,” summary judgment 
should be granted “unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the 
nonmovant.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any 
basis supported by the record, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam), and we may take summary action if this appeal does not present a 
substantial question, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  For substantially the reasons 
                                                                                                                                                  
Bivens claims.”  Lora-Pena v. FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 505 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).     
3 We apply a different standard of review when “reviewing an order of a District Court 
granting summary judgment in proceedings seeking disclosure under the FOIA.”  
Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam); see id. (describing the two-tiered test for such claims).  Kaplan’s complaint did 
not appear to seek disclosure under FOIA; rather, to the extent that he sought relief for a 
violation of FOIA, he asked for money damages.  As explained later in this opinion, a 
claim for money damages is not cognizable under FOIA, and we see no need to apply in 
this case the test that governs claims that are properly brought under FOIA. 
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provided by the District Court, we agree with its conclusion that Kaplan’s Bivens claims 
fail.  As for his FTCA claim, which concerned the alleged denial of an attorney visit in 
2010, such a claim is properly brought against the United States, not federal 
officials/employees.  See, e.g., Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 
Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see also 
Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The express purpose of 
the FTCA is to make the United States liable ‘in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2674).  Even if Kaplan had amended his complaint so that his FTCA claim was 
directed against the United States, that claim would still have failed.  Indeed, as the 
District Court explained, that claim was untimely and equitable tolling was not 
warranted.  Lastly, Kaplan’s FOIA claims were not cognizable for two reasons.4  First, 
those claims may not be brought against federal officials/employees.  See, e.g., Drake v. 
Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).  Second, money 
damages — the relief that Kaplan sought here — are not available under FOIA.  See, e.g., 
Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 675 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009); Johnson 
v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 816 (8th Cir. 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                  
     
4 As a result, we need not determine whether the District Court correctly concluded that 
these claims fail for lack of exhaustion. 
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 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Kaplan’s motion for appointment of counsel is 
denied, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), as is his “Motion Directing 
All Courts to Reverse Its Erroneous Decisions Based upon the Government Informant 
John[]Garafalo Being a Government Agent not an Inmate which Requires Reversal.”     
